Effective oversight of police by civilian authorities: what powers are needed

Speaker:
Kevin Brosseau
Senior Director for Operations, Commission for Public Complaints against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

Abstract:
The public safety environment has changed considerably since the Commission for Public Complaints Against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police was created in 1988. Transnational organised crime, money laundering, crimes on the internet and global terrorism have spawned new legislation, larger budgets for national security and public safety organisations, new use of force tools and new approaches to law enforcement.

The cumulative effect of these initiatives has been to increase the level of intrusion by the state into the realm of individual privacy rights. Such intrusion for the sake of the public interest is acceptable in a democracy to the extent that it enjoys public support. Maintaining that support requires that police be held genuinely accountable for the use of extraordinary powers of surveillance, arrest, detention and force. Civilian oversight of the police is an essential feature of an effective accountability regime and must possess powers commensurate to modern police agencies. Not surprisingly, public expectations regarding police accountability in general, and civilian oversight in particular, have also evolved in the over 20 years since the Commission was created; citizens are demanding more engagement and a more effective, visible and critical mechanism for overseeing law enforcement activities in Canada. The public is no longer satisfied with an antiquated complaint taking body — it is expecting more.

Despite the fact that as compared to other countries Canada’s police officers and institutions (in particular, the RCMP) still enjoy much support, there has been a gradual erosion of public confidence in the police, in large part, due to a perceived lack of accountability. Over the past two decades, the Commission has observed a sea change over that period that entails a growing lack of respect and trust for public institutions including police institutions. One sees that general trend expressed daily in the media whether it is by a blogger, a letter written to the editor, an article by a journalist or an editorial. This cynicism is chronic as opposed to episodic.

Moreover, high-profile incidents of alleged police misconduct have contributed to this cynicism. One notable case recently addressed by the Commission involved an allegation that the former Commissioner of the RCMP improperly interfered with the electoral process which interference led to the defeat of the governing party. While such allegations are relatively rare, arguably they contribute to the erosion of public trust. Police efforts to address these concerns have been perceived largely as self serving. Unsuccessful efforts to address public concerns have in a number of cases merely compounded public cynicism.

In addition to growing cynicism, the changing nature of organisations such as the RCMP necessitates enhanced oversight. As Canada’s national police force with approximately 29,000 employees, the scope of its activities range from patrol to international and national security enforcement and myriad duties in between. Furthermore, with heightened rates of attrition, its members are becoming increasingly inexperienced and lacking effective mentoring.

The Commission has reflected at length about how it (and other similar agencies) might more effectively respond to the realities of today's public safety environment and the heightened expectations of citizens. Accordingly, among other powers, a credible oversight body must be able to:

• access all relevant information as of right, possess the power to summon witnesses, take evidence under oath and to subpoena documents, short of calling a potentially very expensive hearing or inquiry
• review systemic issues relating to programs, training and policy absent a specific public complaint; examine specific activities and programs of the police at the oversight body’s discretion
• audit and report on police follow-up action on the oversight body’s recommendations; monitor and report on police activities in respect of public complaints; and work collaboratively, as appropriate, with other oversight bodies at both the federal and provincial level.

These powers must also respect the line between ‘review’ and ‘oversight’. In the example cited above, the former Commissioner of the RCMP could not be compelled to talk about his role as the Commission currently lacks this power. Another example of the failings of a complaint-driven model is manifested in the area of national security enforcement where people generally aren’t aware of the activities of the police and therefore can not complain. Credible and effective regime of civilian oversight of the police is an essential mechanism whereby the public and their police may jointly participate in a respectful dialogue the ultimate goal of which is to restore and maintain the public trust in the police individually and as an institution. Moreover, effective civilian oversight would not only address the public's concerns but would also assist the police who are increasingly professionalising their role and have become more remote from the concerns of citizens. An oversight body can thus bridge the police/public divide by asking questions that the police frequently don't ask themselves and by offering recommendations that would be more responsive to citizens concerns. Simply put, effective oversight helps brings the public perspective to the police.